Go-to-Market Strategy
CeibaQ does not enter its market the way a software company does. There are no thousands of small accounts to convert and no self-serve sign-up. The market for Amazon forest data is thin, concentrated and institutional, and the first customer is usually also the first funder. So the entry is won one jurisdiction at a time, and the prize in the early years is position more than revenue: becoming the measurement rail a jurisdiction builds its forest-carbon program on, before any competitor is in the room. A forest jurisdiction signs a measurement provider once, on a five-to-twenty-year horizon, and rarely changes it. The first signatures are therefore a land-grab on the rail itself.
The entry product is jurisdictional verification (see Revenue Streams): a government selling an independently verifiable account of two things — that its forest is standing, and where it is being degraded under the canopy. The buyer of record is a forest authority, but the money comes from climate finance, a multilateral fund or a bilateral donor, and the authority engages CeibaQ as the measurement supplier inside that funded program. We do not issue the credits and we do not write the standards. We supply the evidence layer they rely on. That keeps the role clean, and it means the entry is paid by climate capital rather than by a government's own thin budget.
Why the buyer signs: the measurement pays for itself. A jurisdiction's payment from a climate fund is tied by contract to its forest data, so the willingness to pay is built in. The deeper reason it signs is arithmetic. Under the ART-TREES standard that governs jurisdiction-scale forest payments, the creditable tonnes a jurisdiction can sell are cut in proportion to its measurement uncertainty. By measuring the degradation a satellite cannot see, CeibaQ hands back credits that would otherwise have been deducted. Those recovered credits are worth roughly two to eight times our fee, depending on the carbon price the jurisdiction sells into. The buyer spends to earn more, which is what makes the entry sale repeatable rather than a one-off grant.
Payer return on a $0.20/hectare fee: $0.38–0.57 recovered per hectare at LEAF prices ($10–15 a tonne) · $1.15–1.53 recovered per hectare at Article 6.2 prices ($30–40 a tonne) · 2–8× earned back by the jurisdiction. (Mechanism verified against ART-TREES rules; magnitude gated on the field pilot.)
The first jurisdiction: two entry points that meet in Loreto
The whole strategy rests on the first jurisdiction, and there are two ways into it. They are not competing bets. They overlap on the same ground.
The first is Loreto as a whole. Loreto is the largest forest region of Peru, around 35 million hectares, and it is where CeibaQ already holds its assets: a 90,000-hectare concession secured for 40 years, a signed cooperation agreement with the regional government (GOREL) covering an initial 402,000 hectares with an option to roughly 2.48 million, separate agreements with the national environment ministry, forest service and oversight body, and standing relationships with the two regional science institutions that validate the work (UNAP and IIAP). Entering through GOREL means the largest possible denominator from day one, against the longer procurement cycle a region-wide contract carries.
The second is the Indigenous Jurisdictional Program (RIJ). Peru has launched the first indigenous-led, jurisdiction-wide forest program in the world, jointly between the environment ministry (MINAM) and a coalition of three Amazonian indigenous federations (AIDESEP, CONAP and ANECAP), under a cooperation agreement signed in 2024 and being operationalized through 2025 and 2026. It covers about 7 million hectares across Loreto, Amazonas and Ucayali, takes in 992 communities and five communal reserves, runs on the same ART-TREES standard and Peru's national mitigation registry, and lets the communities trade their forest-carbon credits and receive the proceeds directly. It carries a stated potential of up to $100 million in international funding and won the American Carbon Registry's Climate Impact Award in 2025.
The RIJ matters to CeibaQ for three concrete reasons. It names independent measurement, reporting and verification of its forests as the thing it needs in order to access finance — exactly the under-canopy degradation layer we sell. It runs on ART-TREES, the same standard our entire payer-return arithmetic is built on. And it includes Loreto, where our concession, agreements and science partners already sit. So the indigenous program is not an alternative to entering Loreto; it is the cleanest wedge into it, carrying built-in demand for measurement and the social legitimacy of community co-ownership. CeibaQ's role there is as a measurement supplier, approached through the indigenous chamber agreement and the science institute, not as an owner of the communities' data, which stays with them.
| Loreto as a whole | Indigenous Jurisdictional Program (RIJ) | |
|---|---|---|
| Scale | ~35M hectares | ~7M hectares (Loreto, Amazonas, Ucayali) |
| Counterparties | GOREL, MINAM, SERFOR | MINAM and three indigenous federations |
| Our standing assets | concession, signed agreements, science partners | the same, on the Loreto overlap; routed via the indigenous chamber |
| Who pays | climate funds and Norway's live program | credit buyers and donors behind the program, up to $100M |
| Demand for our wedge | strong | built into the program's own design |
There is one honest gap. The figures and the latest milestone of the indigenous program are taken from MINAM's own public material and from carbon-market reporting, and CeibaQ has no signed role in it yet. It is a route to pursue, not a contract in hand.
The sequence: land, standardize, extend, replicate
The market entry follows the build sequence (see Funding, Risk & Compliance), one product shipping each year. The motion underneath it has four moves.
[DIAGRAM — four-phase timeline: 2027 Land · 2028 Standardize · 2029–30 Extend · 2031+ Replicate, with the product shipped and the gate under each.]
- Land (2027). Sign the first jurisdictional contract, in Loreto, through one of the two entry points above. This is the year-one gate of the whole plan: a first signature that fixes the per-hectare price and the hectare count. Revenue is recognized from 2028 as the work is delivered. Until that signature, everything past it is intent.
- Standardize (2028). Get CeibaQ's method written into the formal procedures Peru uses for its Article 6.2 agreements. Once the method is inside the official procedure, two more streams open against it: monitoring-as-a-service for private project developers, and the enterprise data license for companies, reinsurers and supply-chain buyers. This turns a single government contract into a repeatable framework.
- Extend (2029, revenue from 2030). Open the two streams that do not depend on any single jurisdiction. Outcome verification sells to development banks issuing nature and outcome bonds; natural-capital accounting sells whole national ecosystem accounts to environment ministries. Both ride on the field layer already deployed, and both reach across countries.
- Replicate (2031 onward). Take the two proven mechanisms — jurisdictional degradation measurement and the Article 6.2 method — and repeat them across the other Amazon countries (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia), where the reference model is reused at marginal field cost. This is what carries modelled revenue from about $53.9M in 2031 to about $108.3M in 2035. Both figures are management estimates gated on execution, not forecasts.
Who we sell through
The counterparties that matter are the institutions that hold the money, not a pipeline of small buyers. On the funding side: the multilateral forest funds (the Tropical Forests Forever Facility, the LEAF Coalition through Emergent, the Green Climate Fund), the bilateral donors (Norway's program with Peru is live, paying about $10 a tonne, with $10 million already received and an envelope above $200 million), and the development banks that both fund the platform and later buy the bond verification. In Peru the cash is routed through the national environmental fund PROFONANPE, the single fiscal counterparty where the Green Climate Fund and Norway's money already converge. The route into the indigenous program runs through the indigenous chamber agreement and the regional science institute, which also supplies the independent validation buyers ask for.
The honest counterweight. This is a pre-revenue company with no signed customers, selling into government and donor cycles that run long. The near-term measure of progress is not revenue; it is a signed letter of intent with a hectare number, then a field pilot that proves the measurement, then the first contract. The plan concentrates that risk deliberately on one place and one product first — jurisdictional degradation in Loreto — because spreading a small team across more would weaken all of it.
Forward-looking statement: figures beyond 2027 are management estimates gated on execution, not forecasts. The payer-return mechanism is verified against the ART-TREES rules, with the exact magnitude gated on the field pilot. The Indigenous Jurisdictional Program figures are from MINAM public material and carbon-market reporting; CeibaQ holds no signed role in that program as of June 2026.